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In 1994, nearly sixty percent of America's gross
domestic product was generated by its corporations 1 . Ever
since the advent of the large industrial corporation in the
United States, there has been periodic outrage at payment
made to its top executives. Executive compensation level
has rose steadily during the 1980s 2 . Not only did the
level of executive compensation rise, but during that same
period, the rate of executive compensation growth was
greatly exceeding the rate of growth of the average
American's salary 3 . For example, by the early 1990s, the
average salary of a CEO was prodigious under any standard 4 .
Such a magnitude of executive compensation was difficult to
comprehend for the average American 5 . During the same
1 Bureau of economic analysis, U.S Department of Commerce,
surv. Current bus. (Jan 1994) .
2 See for example Shareholders Rights, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess. 49 (1991)
3 Id. at 16
4 Bevis Logstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders Growing Role
in Executive Compensation (pt. 1), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992
5 Robert A. Rosenblatt, Firms Must Fully Report Officers
Pay, L.A TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al, A34
.
2time, America was suffering through a moderate recession 6 .
The unemployed were thus confronted with stories of multi-
million dollar salaries paid to CEOs 7 , and the gap between
what they were earning and what they were thought to be
worth seemed gigantic 8 . In 1992, excessive executive
compensation was publicly targeted, and even became a
widely discussed populist topic during the 1992 election
year. Nevertheless, such a debate over executive pay is
not new. In 1983, Professor Vagts began an article on the
subject with a recitation of the business and political
background that could easily be used nowadays : « Tremors
here and there indicate that a new wave of concern about
the generosity of management compensation may be on the
way. From the courts one observe a string of cases
attacking compensation practices, particularly stock
options and other stock plans...
Even some business writers have arched eyebrows over
the recent surge in management compensation that had
carried the best paid executives to well over the one
million dollar line, which seemed for years—like the stock
market's Dow Jones « one thousand »--to serve as a
6 Andrew R. Bronstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay ? The Press ? Congress ? Shareholders ?, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May-June 1992, at 28
7 Id.
8 The Boss's Pay, Wall Street J., April 21, 1993, at R13
3psychological barrier to advances » 9 . In the same way,
forty years ago J. A. Livingston predicted an
« investigation of executive remuneration » 10 which « could
make unpleasant headlines » 1]-.
The public criticism executives compensation faced is
not only due to the fact that compensation has became so
high, but also to the fact that those executives are not
always expected to receive such compensation. Indeed, the
traditional rule is that a director is not entitled to
compensation for services as director. Thus, in Cahall v.
Lofland 12 the court held that directors were presumed to
serve without compensation 13 . Nevertheless, such rule is
not without exception. Indeed, in Lofland v. Cahall 14 the
Supreme Court of Delaware set forth four factors which it
found were required to be considered in determining the
right of directors to receive compensation for services
rendered their corporation. First, the Court held that
directors of a corporation were trustees for the
stockholders, and that their acts were therefore governed
by the rules applicable to such a relation, which exacted
from them the utmost good faith and fair dealing,
° Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation : For the Markets
or for the Courts ?, 8 J. Corp. L. 231 (1983)
10 The American Stockholder (1958), at 229
11 Id, at 230
12 114 A. 224 (1921)
13 Id. at 229
14 118 A. 1 (1922)
4especially where their individual interest were
concerned 15 . Second, the Court stated that directors had
no right to compensation for services rendered within the
scope of their duties as directors, unless it was
authorized by the charter, by-laws, or other stockholders
of the company 16 . Third, the Court added that directors
had no right to compensation for services rendered outside
their duties as directors unless there had been an express
contract to pay for such services, or, as some cases hold,
unless the services were clearly outside the their duties
as directors and were performed under circumstances
sufficient to show that it was understood that the services
were to be paid for by the corporation 17 . Finally, the
court held that a contract to pay for such services had to
be made with the directors or other proper corporate
officers who had no personal interest, directly or
indirectly in the contract, and who were competent to
represent the company in the transaction 18 . As will be
later discussed, the Lofland case 19 still applies nowadays.
If no contract has been made with such directors or proper
corporate officers, the courts may allow recovery for
services rendered based on the existence of an implied





5contract, or on the theory of quantum meruit 20 . The same
rules apply to the officers of a corporation21 .
When a director or officer is entitled to recover some
compensation for services rendered to the corporation, two
main limitations apply. First, such a right is limited by
the notion of conflict of interest. A conflict of interest
arises whenever a director or officer acts both as a
representative of the corporation and in his own interest.
Therefore, the concept of conflict of interest will
interfere in the fixation of officers and directors
compensation in different situations : a director-officer
will have a conflict of interest in connection with any
action by the board of directors adopting or approving a
contract fixing compensation for his services as an officer
or employee of the corporation. Likewise, an officer will
have a conflict of interest even if he is not part of the
board of directors adopting his compensation if he
exercises a domination upon the said board of directors
(see infra)
. The second limitation applying to officers or
directors compensation is the one of waste or gift of
corporate assets. Hence, an agreement to pay executive
compensation that is unreasonable or excessive may be held
unenforceable against the corporation.
20 Technicorp International II, Inc. v. Johnston
, 1997 WL 538671
(1997), not reported in A. 2d
2 1 Id.
Keeping those facts in mind, the aim of this thesis is
to introduce the rules applied by American jurisdictions
(and more specially Delaware) when confronted with officers
or directors compensation, in order to establish a road map
for the corporations with regard to such compensation. The
first chapter of the thesis will therefore deal with the
fixation of officers and directors compensation, whereas
the second chapter will study the standards such
compensation has to meet in order to be held valid.
Finally, the third chapter will look at the possibility of
compensating officers and directors for services rendered
when no compensation has legally been adopted.
CHAPTER I
FIXATION OF OFFICERS COMPENSATION
I . GENERALLY
Generally an officer of a corporation is held to be
without authority to fix or increase his own salary22 .
However, corporate directors may, by statute, charter,
bylaws or the stockholders, be given the power to fix their
own salaries 23 . Statutes in many jurisdictions grant such
authority to directors 24 . For example, section 122(5) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law provides for the
compensation by a corporation of its officers and agents 25 .
Section 122 provides in pertinent part :
« Every corporation created under this chapter shall
have power to :
22 14 A. Corpus Juris, 143 : « Directors are precluded from fixing,
increasing or voting compensation to themselves for either past or
future services by them as directors or officers, unless they are
expressly authorized to do so by the charter or by the stockholders »
23 Pogostin v Rice (Del. Sup. ) 480 A2d 619 (1984)
24 Many of such statutes are patterned after the Model Business
Corporation Act which provides that the board of directors shall have
authority to fix the compensation of directors unless otherwise
provided in the article of incorporation. Model Business Corporation
Act § 35.
25 8 Del. C. Sec. 122(5)
8Appoint such officers and agents as the business of
the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise provide
for them suitable compensation. » 26 .
In addition, the board of director is vested with
large powers as to the amount of the compensation, powers
conferred by Section 141 (h) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law27 which states that 11:
« Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of
incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors shall have
the authority to fix the compensation of directors. » 28 .
Finally, directors have control over the form of the
remuneration. Indeed, section 157 of Delaware General
Corporation Law29 , which confers broad discretion upon
directors in the issuance of stock option and rights,
provide in pertinent part :
« Subject to any provisions in the certificate of
incorporation, every corporation may create and issue, . .
.
rights or options entitling the holders thereof to purchase
from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any
class or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by




28 8 Del. C. Sec. 141 (h)
29 Del. C. Sec. 157
9The terms upon which, including the time or times
which may be limited or unlimited in duration, at or within
which ; and the price or prices at which any such shares
may be purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of
any such right or option, shall be stated in the
certificate of incorporation, or in a resolution adopted by
the board of directors providing for the creation and issue
of such rights of options, and, in every case, shall be
set forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or
instruments evidencing such rights or options. In the
absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of
the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of
such rights or options and the sufficiency thereof shall be
conclusive. » 30
Similarly, section 5.03(a) (2) and (3) of the American
Law Institute is intended to vest wide discretion in
disinterested directors as to the fixation of officers and
directors compensation 31 . Comment e. of section 5.03 32
precise that it is not intended to limited director's
discretion in fashioning compensation arrangements or
30 id.
31 A.L.I, sec. 5.03 which state as a general rule that « A
director [s . 1 . 13] or senior executive [s.1.33] who receives
compensation from the corporation for services in that capacity
fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the compensation if
(2) the compensation is authorized in advance by disinterested
directors ... ;
(3) the compensation is ratified by disinterested directors... ».
A.L.I sec. 5.03, comment e. Limitation on compensation
arrangements
10
levels of compensation, to those level that are usual in
the industry in which a corporation operates. In the
contrary, under section 5.03 a corporation should be free
to award liberal or novel forms of compensation to attract
valuable executives 33 . In the same way, providing
incentives such as stock options at level higher that might
usually be considered appropriate should be permitted under
section 5.03 on the basis of the situation in which the
corporation finds itself 34 .
There is a long established principle in Delaware
corporation law that directors of a corporation owe the
corporation and its shareholders a duty of loyalty35 . This
duty mandates that directors refrain from self-dealing and
place the interest of the corporation and its shareholders
over any personal interest the director may possess that is
not equally shared by the shareholders 36 . The question is
33 id.
34 id.
35 This duty was indeed described by Chief Justice Layton in duty was
indeed described by Chief Justice Layton in Gulf v. Loft, Inc. , 5 A. 2d
503, at 510 (1939) : « Corporate officers and directors are not
permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
their private interests .. .A public policy, existing through the years,
and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristic and
motives, has established a rule that demands of corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty, not affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it
of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it, or enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and
unselfish loyalty to the corporation demand that there shall be no
conflict between duty and self interest. »
36 Rales v. Blasban, 634 A. 2d 927, at 936 (1993)
11
thus how to reconcile this with the power of directors to
vote compensation.
II. FIXATION OF COMPENSATION AND SELF-DEALING
Director self-interest typically arises whenever
divided loyalty are present, or when a director either has
received or is entitled to receive a personal financial
benefit from the challenged transaction which is not
equally shared by the stockholders 37 . It appears pretty
clearly that such will be the case whenever a director will
vote upon his own compensation. Similarly, there will be a
self-interest transaction every time that the directors
voting upon it will be dominated or controlled by an
individual interested in the transaction 38 . This will
often be the case nowadays as directors have more and more
influence, and transactions are rarely at arm-length. The
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance
answer this question in the body of section 5.03 itself.
Indeed, it specifies that the compensation of directors or
senior executives must be authorized in advance or ratified
by disinterested directors 39 . In comment g., it is noticed
that under the A.L.I principles the board of directors will
be disinterested in voting compensation for one of its
37 Poqostin v. Rice
, 480 A. 2d 619, at 623 (1984)
38 Green v. Phillips
, 1996 WL 342093 (1996) (not reported in A. 2d)
39 A.L.I, sec. 5.03
12
members as an executive or in some other nondirectorial
capacity, whereas it will be interested if it votes
directorial compensation for itself. The comment adds that
the so called « back-scratching », which constitute in
directors voting to approve each others compensation, is
not a disinterested director's action. Such rule is far
from being new. This situation had been illustrated by the
case of Steele v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining Co. 40 about
ninety years ago. In this case, the board of directors was
composed of three directors, the salary of two of which was
to be fixed by the resolution attacked. The resolution had
been adopted and the validity of both salaries had been
challenged. Each of the interested director had maintained
that « the vote of the other two directors was sufficient
to render the resolution valid. » 41 . The court had
rejected this argument, holding that where two of the three
directors of a corporation where officers whose salaries
were fixed in a single resolution, they were both
disqualified from voting upon such resolution. 42 On the
other hand, section 122(5) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law43 provides no answer on this point. The
early Common Law was very intolerant of a director's self-
40 95 P. 349 (1908)
4 1 Id.
42 id.
43 8 Del. C.
13
interest. Thus, it had been stated in Lofland v. Cahall 44
that a contract to pay compensation to directors or
officers for services rendered had to be made with
directors or other proper corporate officers who had no
personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract,
and who were competent to represent the corporation in the
transaction. Indeed, if interested directors participated
in the vote of the decision, this one was considered void,
or at least voidable. Nevertheless, in Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways, Inc. 45 the Supreme Court of Delaware had
upheld a decision fixing compensation where three of the
eight directors present at the meeting were interested in
it, on the ground that the said decision had still been
adopted by a majority of disinterested directors. The
court had held that « [t]he presence and vote of interested
directors without more (though perhaps undesirable) should
not affect the validity of corporate action taken by a
majority of a disinterested quorum of directors » 46 .
According to the court, the rationale was that « if the
interested directors can influence the disinterested
directors, they will do so whether they are present or not
and whether they vote or not .» 47 . It had also been
recognized that directors who were the sole stockholders in
44 118 A. .1 (1922)




a corporation could vote themselves salaries. Indeed,
courts had pointed to the fact that in the case of a
closely held corporation, where the directors were also the
officers and stockholders, self dealing on salary questions
were inevitable as a practical matter. At least in such a
case, therefore, self-dealing did not of itself renders
void the action of a board of directors in which the
interested director participated. Whether the board's
action was voidable in such a case at the instance of a
non-assenting stockholder depended on all the
circumstances, including a consideration of the
reasonableness of the action 48 . The rationale for such a
conclusion was that a closely held corporation, where the
members of the board personally conducted and directed
business, could not be held to the same strict formalities
as are large corporations. Since then, the Delaware
General Assembly has enacted a conflict of interest statute
in 1967, and this statute has not been amended since
1969 49 . Section 144 provide some safe harbor by stating
that corporate action should not be invalidated on ground
of conflict of interest if the conflict is disclosed to and
approved by a majority of disinterested members of the
board or a committee of disinterested directors... Such
48 Chamber v. Beaver advance Corporation, 140 A. 2d 808 (1958)
49 Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, § 144, 56 Del. Laws 151, 170 (1967),
as amended by ch. 148, § 7, 57 Del. Laws (1969) (codified as amended
at Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 144 (1991))
15
safe harbor is even more useful nowadays where most top
executives are in an unusually strong position to strike a
favorable bargain, because they exert such influence over
the process of fixing executive compensation ; therefore,
the task of fixing the compensation of executive is hardly
an arm's-length transaction 50 . Furthermore, if the
transaction is approved by a majority of disinterested
directors, the transaction cannot be invalidated solely
because an interested director is involved 51 . Section 144
does not provide the only validation procedure for
interested transactions ; ratification principles also
apply to transactions that fall outside the scope of the
statutory provisions 52 , and courts have therefore
determined that the key to upholding an interested
transaction regardless of the applicability of the safe
harbor provision is the approval of some neutral decision-
making body 53 , such as shareholders. Nevertheless, as
section 144 applies to contracts between a corporation and
one or more of its directors, it therefore applies to the
compensation issue. But, we will see in Chapter II of this
thesis that ratification of a transaction by shareholders
50 Derek Bok, The Cost of Talent ; How Executives and Professional
Are Paid and How It Affects America 78 (1993) at 98. Note that
America 78 is a graph comparing the top salaries for CEOs.
51 Flieger , 351 A. 2d at 222
52 Marciano v. Nakash , 535 A. 2d 400, at 402 (1987)
53 Oberly , 592 A. 2d at 467
16
still has some influence upon the problem of officers and
directors compensation.
We have just seen that the power of fixing directors'
and officers' compensation belonged to the board of
directors, and that such a power could be reconciled with
the duty of loyalty of the directors that mandate them to
refrain from self-dealing. Nevertheless, self-dealing is
not the only obstacle to the fixation of officers and
directors compensation. Indeed, we will see that when the
courts review decisions fixing officers' and directors'
compensation, they apply different standards to the
determination of its validity.
CHAPTER II :
REVIEW OF COMPENSATION
The power of the board of directors to fix
compensation is very important. Nevertheless, it is not
unlimited. The corporation has the ability to challenge a
decision establishing directors or officers compensation.
Similarly, dissenting stockholders may bring a derivative
action against such a decision. When a board's resolution
is challenged, the court to which the matter is referred
will first decide whether it has the power to review it or
not. If the court concludes that it is competent to hear
about the problem, it will then have to apply different
standards in order to determine whether the decision of the
board of directors must be upheld or not.
I. POWER OF COURTS TO REVIEW OFFICERS COMPENSATION
As a general principle, courts are very hesitant to
review decisions made by the board of directors of a
corporation, including decisions concerning officers or
directors compensation. A court refusal to review such a
decision may be due either to the application of the
business judgment rule, or because of the ratification of
the decision by a majority of the stockholders of the
17
18
corporation. Nevertheless, the presumption of validity
created either by the application of the business judgment
rule or by the ratification of the decision by the
shareholders are not irrebutable. Therefore, courts will
review decisions fixing officers or directors compensation
when such presumptions do not apply.
A. APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Generally, decisions of the board of directors are
protected by the business judgment rule. Hence, it has
been held that executive compensation was a matter
ordinarily left to the business judgment of a company's
board of directors 54 . Nevertheless as we have previously
seen, the main problem with compensation decision is when
such a decision is an interested one. The question
therefore is whether the business judgment rule applies in
such a case.
Protection of the business judgment rule can normally
only be claimed by disinterested and independent directors.
But, the essential element being that the decision is made
by a « disinterested and independent corporate decision
maker » 55
, it will equally apply to an interested director
transaction, provided that such transaction was approved by
either a committee of independent directors or a majority
54 Lewis v. Hirsh
, 1994 WL 263551 (1994) (not reported in A. 2d)
55 Nixon, 626 A. 2d at 1376
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of independent shareholders 56 . The business judgment rule
is the descendent of the principle that the business and
affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under
its board of directors 57 . According to Zapata v.
Maldonado 58 , the purpose of the business judgment rule is
to protect and promote the full exercise of the managerial
power granted to directors in Delaware. Section 122(5) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law59 granting the board
of directors the power to adopt compensation, the business
judgment rule applies to its decisions fixing
compensation 60 . The business judgment rule is in fact « a
presumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interest of the company » 61 . Thus, for the
56 See for example Aronson v. Lewis , 473 A. 2d 805 (1984), which
provides that if director interest is present in a transaction, and
the transaction is not approved by a majority of disinterested
directors, the business judgment rule is not applicable)
5
' 8 Del. C. § 141(a) : « The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If
any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the
powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by
this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by
such any person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation
.
58 430 A. 2d 779, at 782 (1984)
59 8 Del. C, sec. 122(5)
60 Journal of Corporation Law, The Corporate Independent Duty as a
Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 1992, citing
Aronson v. Lewis
,
473 A. 2d 805 (1984)
61 Smith v. Van Gorkom
, 488 A. 2d 858 (1985) at872, citing Aronson v,
Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (1984) at 812
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court to review a decision concerning the compensation of
directors and officers, the party attacking it must rebut
the presumption that it was an informed one 62 , i.e. show
that the directors have not informed themselves of all
material information reasonably available prior to making
their business decision 63 .
Such duty of directors to inform themselves prior to
the making of a business decision is greatly detailed in
Smith v. Van Gorkom 64 . This duty derives from the
fiduciary capacity of the director with regard to the
corporation and its shareholders 65 . Therefore, when making
a business decision directors are « bound to act out of
fidelity and honestly in their role as fiduciary » 66 . But
according to the Smith case 67 , the mere absence of bad
faith or fraud is not enough for a director to fulfill his
fiduciary duty. Indeed, the court explained that since the
directors represent the interests of others, they must act
with caution when evaluating the information given to them.
As far as compensation is concerned, directors may not, for
example, deprive the minority of a fair return upon its
investment by way of excessive salaries and other devices
62 id.
6 3 id.
64 488 A. 2d 858 (1985'
65 Id., citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 457 A. 2d 701 (1983;
66 Michelson v. Duncan
,
407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at 217
67 488 A. 2d 858 (1985)
21
because of their position 68 , or because of a failure to
inform themselves before adopting a compensation. Hence,
the duty resting on directors to exercise an informed
judgment is a duty of care. The standard of care
applicable in this case has been stated by the same court
in Aronson v. Lewis 69 : « under the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon the concepts of gross
negligence ». In Smith v. Van Gorkom70 , the Supreme court
of Delaware confirmed its previous conclusion and added
that the concept of gross negligence is also the one
applying to determine whether a board of directors reached
an informed business judgment. The standards against which
the conduct of directors must be tested regarding their
exercise of an informed business judgment in approving a
compensation is the one of a person of ordinary sound
judgment 71 . Indeed, the court states that it is possible
to infer that a decision granting compensation is not
protected by the business judgment rule because it is a
decision in which the consideration received by the
corporation is « so inadequate that no person of ordinary
sound judgment would deem it worth what the corporation
paid » 72 . Furthermore, the court in Aronson indicates that
68 Id., citing Backer v. Conn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 at 166 (1942)
69 473 A. 2d 805 (1984), at 812
70 488 A. 2d 858 (1985), at 873
71 Kaufman v. Beal
, 1983 WL 20295 (1983) (not reported in A. 2d)
72 Id. at 5, citing Saxe v. Brady , 184 A. 2d 602 (1962)
23
be considered as a report under § 141(e), a report must at
least be pertinent to the subject matter upon which the
board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good
faith reliance 76 . But, the board of directors is not
entitled to rely upon a mere threat of litigation,
acknowledged by counsel, as constituting either a legal
advice or any valid basis upon which to pursue an
uninformed course 77 . The rationale given by the court is
that even if a suit might result from the action taken (in
this case the rejection of a merger or tender offer),
« Delaware law makes clear that a board acting within the
ambit of the business judgment rule faces no ultimate
liability » 78 .
Finally, in Smith 79 the court considered the question
of the eventual rectification and cure of a board's failure
to reach an informed decision. In the said case 80 , the
defendant was arguing that its alleged breach of duty of
care by not reaching an informed decision had been cured by
its subsequent conduct (after accepting a merger agreement
76 8 Del. C. : « a member of the board of directors . . . shall in the
performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith
upon the books of accounts or reports made to the corporation by any
of its officers, or by an independent certified public accountant, or
by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board of
directors . .
.
, or in relying in good faith upon other records of the
corporation
.
77 Smith v. Van Gorkom , 488 A. 2d 858 (1984)at 881
78 Id.
79 Id. at 881
80 Id,
24
quite hurriedly, the board of directors of the corporation
had met again allegedly to reconsider the merger proposal
by amending the agreement) . Based on the elements of the
case, the court held that the subsequent conduct of the
board had not remedied to its breach of duty of care. Two
conclusions can be drawn from this : first, the court
impliedly recognized the possibility to rectify a lack of
information in the making of a business decision, second
the court stated that such possibility must be studied with
regard to the particular facts of the case. As to the
eventual curative effects of a board' s conduct subsequent
to the adoption of a decision, the court stated that it
will depend on the reasonableness of the reliance of the
board of directors on the subsequent actions taken ; once
again, the court explained that this determination will be
based on the particular facts of the case 81 .
As the definition of the business judgment rule
states, it is also composed of two other elements : good
faith and promotion of the best interest of the company.
Thus, as well as a decision will not be protected by the
business judgment rule if not informed, it will not be
protected if it has not been made in good faith and in what
the directors believe to be the best interest of the
corporation. In Kaufman v. Beal 82
, the court concluded
81 Id. at 885
82 1983 WL 20295 (1983) (not reported in A. 2d)
25
that the transaction at bar was not protected by the
business judgment rule because it was « totally undirected
to a corporate purpose » 83 , insisting on the fact that when
a transaction was totally unconnected to a valid corporate
purpose the very nature of the transaction was calling the
business judgment of the board of directors into question,
hence mandating further judicial scrutinity.
Another factor bearing an influence on court's review
of decisions granting compensation to directors or officers
is the approval of such decision by independent
shareholders
.
B. RATIFICATION BY SHAREHOLDERS
The rule was originally set forth in Rogers v. Hill 84
In this case, in accordance with its by-law adopted by
the stockholders at their annual meeting, the company was
paying its president and vice presidents large amounts in
addition to their fixed salaries and other sums allowed
them as compensation for services 85 . Plaintiff maintained
that the amounts paid under said by-law were unreasonably
large, and therefore subject to revision by the court. The
Supreme Court of the United States rejected this argument
and stated in the contrary that « The by-law was adopted in
83 Id. at 5, citing Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker , 298 A. 2d 349
(1972)
84 53 S. Ct 731, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)
85 Id. at 585
26
1912 by an almost unanimous vote of the shares represented
at the annual meeting and presumably the stockholders
supporting the measure acted in good faith and according to
their best judgment.! •••) Much weight is to be given to
the action of the stockholders, and the by-law is supported
the presumption of regularity and continuity. » 86 . Since
then, the rule has been codified by section 5.03 of the
American Law Institute Principles of Governance 87 , as well
as by section 144 of the Delaware Code 88 .
1. Effectiveness of ratification by shareholders
For the ratification by shareholders to be effective,
two essential elements must be present : (i) the act
concerned must be voidable and not void, (ii) the
ratification must have been fairly accomplished 89 . In
Michelson , the court indeed held that voidable acts were
susceptible to cure by shareholders approval, while void
acts were not 90 . Void acts include gift or waste of
corporate assets, ultra vires or fraudulent transactions 91 .
If an act is deemed void, it can be cured only by a
86 Id. at 591, 592
p "7
°' section 5.03 provides in pertinent part that a director or senior
executive who receives compensation from a corporation for services in
that capacity fulfills the duty of fair dealing with the corporation
if « (4) the compensation is authorized in advance or ratified by
disinterested shareholders... »
88 8 Del. C, § 144 ( 2)
89 Michelson v. Duncan , 407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at 218, citing Kerbs v.
California Eastern airways
, 90 A. 2d 652 (1952)
90 Id.
91 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at 218, 219
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unanimous shareholder vote 92 . Therefore, when the
compensation granted to officers or directors of a
corporation is challenged as being wasteful, or a gift of
corporate assets, the defense of shareholder ratification
cannot be used, unless such ratification was unanimous.
Such principle is not new and had already been stated more
than fifty years ago by Rogers v. Hill 93 where the court
held that a mere majority of the shareholders may not
condone a waste or gift of the corporate assets to the
prejudice of the minority. Hence, courts would examine the
facts of the situation, notwithstanding independent
stockholders ratification 94 . Such waste or gift of
corporate assets has been defined in Rogers 95 as a payment
having no relation to the value of services for which it is
given. On the contrary, voidable acts are those performed
in the interest of the corporation but beyond the authority
of management, and are not classified as being void 96 . If
the court determine that an act is void, it will then look
at the validity of the ratification and by deciding whether
it was fairly accomplished or not. The first requirement
is one of full disclosure. Indeed, directors have a
fiduciary duty to fully and fairly disclose all material
92 Id. at 219 ; Smith v. Van Gorkom , 488 A. 2d 858 (1984)at 890
93 289 U.S. 582 (1933)
94 Saxe v. Brady , 184 A. 2d. 602 (1962)
9 5 Id.
96 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at
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information within its control when seeking shareholders
approval 97 . It must here be noticed that not only does
this full disclosure obligation applies to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction 98 , but it also
applies to disclosure of the consequences of their vote to
shareholders 99 . Disclosure of all « material » information
being required, the question courts will have to answer is
whether an alleged omission or misrepresentation is
material. The question was answered in Arnold v. Society
for Savings Bancorp, Inc. 100 which held that : « An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote... It does not require proof of a
substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused a reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would gave been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
97 In re Tri-Star picture, Inc ., 634 A. 2d 319 (1993) at 333, 334
98 Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith
, 606 A. 2d 112 (1992), atll4
99 Yiannatsis v. Stephanis
, 653 A. 2d 275 (1995) at 280
100 650 A. 2d 1270 (1994) at 1277 (quoting TSC Indus, v. Northway,
Inc., 426 US 438 (1976) at 449
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the 'total mix' of information available. » 101 . Finally,
the board of directors must balance the potential benefits
of disclosure against its potential harm 102 . The second
requirement for the ratification by shareholders to be
valid is that the approval be received by a majority of the
independent shareholders 103 . Such approval by a majority
of independent shareholders is not statutorily required by
the safe harbor provision of 8 Del. C, § 144.
Nevertheless, Delaware courts have implied that a majority
of disinterested shareholders is required to approve an
interested transaction 104 . Independent shareholders have
been defined as those who are disinterested in the
transaction at issue 105 . Keeping in mind the condition of
validity of ratification by shareholders, the real question
as far as compensation is concerned is the effect of such
ratification on interested transactions.
2. Effect of ratification on interested transactions
Such point has been extensively discussed in Lewis v.
Vogelstein 106 , which begins by stating that the answer to
the question is less clear than one would expect 107 .
101 id.
102 Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A. 2d 1270 (1994
at 1279
103 Gottlieb , 91 A. 2d at 59
104 Flieger , 351 A. 2d at 221
105 Lewis
, 150 A. 2d at 752
106 699 A. 2d 327 (1997)
107 Id. at 334
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Indeed, the courts have not adopted one broad approach, but
have concluded that shareholder ratification has different
meaning in different situations.
The first effect of shareholder ratification can be
the extinguishment of a shareholder claim. Such effect
occurs in two circumstances 108 . The first one is when the
board acted in good faith but exceeded its de jure
authority 109 . In Michelson 110 , the plaintiff was alleging
that the board exceeded its authority in fixing or
increasing the compensation the directors would receive,
and in granting a stock option plan for key executive. In
response to this claim, the directors had sought and
obtained subsequent ratification by the shareholders. The
court held that « it is the law of Delaware, and general
corporate law, that a validly accomplished shareholder
ratification relates back to cure otherwise unauthorized
acts of officers and directors...
If shareholders have approved an otherwise voidable
act, their approval extinguishes any claim for losses based
on prior lack of authority of the directors to undertake
such action. »111 . The second case in which a shareholder
vote can extinguish a claim is where the directors approved
108 In re wheelabrator technologies, Inc., 663 A. 2d 1194 (1995) at
1202
109 Michelson v. Duncan , 407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at 218, 219
110 Id.
111 Id. at 219, 220
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a transaction without reaching « an informed business
judgment » 112 . Despite the fact that the court found the
ratification invalid in this case, the court found that the
board' s lack of due care in approving a transaction was a
voidable act rather than a void one, and could accordingly
be sustained if approved by a majority shareholder vote 113 .
Another possible effect of shareholder ratification of an
interested transaction is to invoke « the business judgment
rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or
waste » 114 , thus referring the transaction to the rules
previously studied.
Finally, ratification by the shareholders can have an
influence on the burden of proof. The question of the
adequacy of consideration is usually committed to the sound
business judgment of the corporation' s directors.
Nevertheless, where the directors have a personal interest
in the application of the corporate payments, i.e. the
transaction is an interested one, the business judgment
rule no longer applies and the burden shifts to the
directors to affirmatively demonstrate its entire fairness
(the standard of fairness that apply to compensation and
its application will be discussed infra) . Therefore, when
a decision fixing the compensation of a director or officer
112 Smith v. Van Gorkom
, 488 A. 2d 858 (1985) at 889
113 id.
114 In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 663 A. 2d 1194 (1995) at
1203
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is an interested one, the burden of proof will rest upon
the beneficiary of the compensation. The rationale behind
such a rule has been stated by the Court of Chancery of
Delaware in Wilderman v. Wilderman 115 . The Court explained
that resting the burden of proof upon the interested
directors was justified because of the fiduciary position
which directors held towards their corporation and its
stockholders 116 . Even if stated some twenty years ago,
such rule is still accurate as directors still owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its stockholders
nowadays. Ratification by independent shareholders will
come into play to place the burden back on the plaintiff to
show that the transaction was unfair 117 . This principle
had been summarized by the court in Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Systems, Inc. 118 as follow : « The initial
burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party
who stands on both side of the transaction. However, an
approval of the transaction by a independent committee of
directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders
shifts the burden of proof on the issue of entire
fairness... ». Of course, that burden will only be shifted
115 315 A. 2d 610 (1974)
116 Id. at 615
117 In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc ., 663 A. 2d 1194 (1995) at
1204
118 638 A. 2d 1110 (1994) at 1114, 1115
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if the interested transaction was subject to a valid
shareholder vote 119 .
Whoever bears the burden of proof, the issue is the
one of what has to be proven, or in other words the
standards apply to compensation of officers and directors
by the courts.
II. STANDARDS FOR A VALID COMPENSATION
Different standards are used by the courts to evaluate
the validity of a decision fixing compensation. The thesis
will discuss the three main ones : reasonableness, the
existence of consideration and fairness.
A. THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD
We have previously seen that the transaction involving
directors and officers compensation could be an interested
one. The application of the fairness standard to
interested transactions has been reaffirmed by the courts
in Marciano v. Nakash 120 . Therefore, entire fairness
applies to transaction fixing officers and directors
compensation. In the Marciano case 121 , a decision from the
Court of Chancery validating a claim for loans made by a
faction owning 50% of the corporation as valid and
119 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. , 638 A. 2d 1110 (1994)
atlll7-1121
120 535 A. 2d 400 (1987)
121 Id.
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enforceable debt of the corporation, notwithstanding their
origin in self dealing transactions, was challenged. The
supreme court held that the court of chancery had properly
applied the intrinsic fairness test in determining the
validity of an interested director transaction 122 .
Plaintiff argued that section 144 of Title 8 Del. C.
provided the only basis for immunizing self interested
transactions, and that since none of the statute's
component tests were satisfied, it could not apply. 123
Thus, plaintiff concluded that common law applied and that
the transaction was voidable per se 124 . The Vice
Chancellor agreed on the fact that the challenged
transaction did not withstand a section 144 analysis, but
nevertheless ruled that the common law did not invalidate a
transaction determined to be intrinsically fair 125 . When
reviewing the decision of the Vice Chancellor, the Supreme
Court confirmed that section 144 did not provide the only
validation standard for interested transactions 126 . The
Supreme court justified its position by stating that it
would overstate the common law rule to conclude that
relationship was the only controlling factor in interested
transactions ; indeed, the invalidation of interested
122 id.





transaction in early Delaware cases was not dictated only
by a tainted relationship 127 . Thus, the court noted that
in Potter v. Sanitary Co. of America 128 it had been
emphasized that interested transactions should be subject
to close scrutiny, and that transaction could be disavowed
by the stockholders where the evidence tended to show that
the personal interest of the directors would be advanced at
the expense of such stockholders 129 . Similarly, interested
director transactions have been deemed voidable only after
an examination of the fairness in other cases decided
before the enactment of section 144 130 . In cases such as
Forman v. Chesler 131 , the fairness standard has even been
used to justify executives compensation. Warrants for the
purchase of stock had been issued by the corporation to two
of its officers for services rendered in connection with
the consummation of two transactions. The market price of
the corporation' s shares subsequently rose to about ten
times the value fixed in the warrant. Plaintiff argued,
among other things, that such subsequent rise in the market
value has resulted, or will result in a waste of corporate
assets to the benefit of the warrant holders. The Supreme
Court of Delaware first stated that « the General
127 Id.
128 194 A> 87 (1937)
129 Id. at 91
130 See for example Keenan v. Eshelman , 2 A. 2d 581 (1948) at 602 ;
Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.
, 64 A. 2d 581 (1948) at 602
131 167 A. 2d 442 (1961)
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Corporation Law explicitly authorizes the issuance of stock
options and warrants ^limited or unlimited in
duration' » 132 (Citations omitted) . The Court then added
that « it is clear that the statute contemplates that the
warrant holder or optionee may, at least under ordinary
circumstances, lawfully expect to enjoy the advantages of
any future increase in value of the shares, to the same
extent as if he had invested in the stock itself. » 133 .
The Court justified its position by explaining that any
other conclusion would be unfair to the beneficiary of the
warrant, and would deprive stock warrants or option of
their essential purpose. Furthermore, the Marciano Court
reminds that it has already refused to view section 144 as
completely preemptive of the common law duty of a
director's fidelity in Flieger v. Lawrence 134 , stating that
« it merely removes an ^interested director' cloud when its
terms are met and provide against invalidation of an
agreement ^solely' because such a director or officer is
involved » 135 . The Marciano Court then adds that the
viability of the intrinsic fairness test is mandated by
situations where shareholders deadlock prevents
ratification, and also where shareholder control by
132 Id. at 445
133 Id. at 445
134 361 A. 2d 218 (1976)
135 Id. at 222
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interested directors precludes independent review 136 . The
court concludes that in such situations the intrinsic
fairness test furnishes the substantive standard against
which the burden of proof of the interested directors is
applied 137 .
Another standard commonly used by the court in
determining the validity of compensation is the standard of
reasonableness
.
B. REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION
In Rogers v. Hill 138 the court held that « if a bonus
payment has no relation to the value of services for which
it is given, it is in reality a gift in part ». Today,
compensation practices used by corporate directors still
come under scrutiny concerning their relationship with
corporate performance 139 . Therefore, if funds are to be
applied to officers or directors compensation, such
remuneration must bear reasonable relation to value of
services for which the funds are applied 140 . The question
then becomes what a reasonable relation to value of
136 Marciano , 535 A. 2d 400 (1987) at 404
137 Id.
138 289 US 582
139 See for example The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of Government Management of
the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess.l
(1991) : « ... it is one thing to have spectacular increases for
spectacular performance. It is another thing to have spectacular pay
increases for dismissal or even mediocre performance. »
140 Kaufman v. beal
, 1983 WL 20295 (1983) (not reported in A. 2d)
38
services to be rendered is, and how a court is going to
determine such reasonable relation. The Missouri Court of
Appeals answered those questions long ago by stating that
« like the reasonableness of an attorney' s fee, the
reasonableness of the compensation paid to an employee is a
question of fact. [...] Ordinarily, like an attorney' s
fee, it is not subject to a precise determination by any
known mathematical formula ; there is no hard and fast rule
to be used in deciding what is reasonable in all cases and
each must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances. » 141 (Citations omitted). Yet, the court
added that « This is not to say that we are wholly without
some guidelines, for the question of what is reasonable
compensation, especially at the executive level, has
received attention from both the text writers and the
courts. » 142 (Citations omitted) . Also decided some thirty
years ago, this case, as well as the one stating the
standards that they fix to determine the reasonableness of
a compensation, can be applied nowadays, as they were
stated in a way sufficiently general to still be accurate.
The first thing one can look at to determine whether
compensation bears a reasonable relation to the value of
the services to be render is the nature and the character
of the services themselves. It has been said that when
141 Ruetz v. Topping
, 453 S.W.2d 624 (1970;
142 Id
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compensation or bonuses are voted to directors, they must
be reasonable and commensurate with the value of the
services rendered 143 . In Meiselman v. Eberstadt 144 the
court held that the ability of the executive was a factor
that needed to be taken into account when looking at the
reasonableness of compensation paid to officer of a
corporation. Thus, the officers of a transportation
corporation that were on duty eighteen hours a day, have
substituted for the hired drivers when needed, have
assisted in making repairs on the road or in the garage, in
other words have « constantly worked for the success of the
enterprise, and have in every way facilitated and made
possible that success » 145 have justified the payment of
weekly salaries of fifty dollars as reasonable compensation
for services rendered to the corporation. The court
explained that such a finding was based on the nature and
extent of the services rendered to the corporation and
described here above 146 . On the contrary, based on the
same standard a court may find that the bonuses or
compensation granted to directors were purely a gift, and
that « compensation for services » was only a pretense 147 .
To come to such a conclusion the court noticed that the
143 Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors (2d Ed.
1973), s. 6.06, p. 109
144 170 A. 2d 720 (1961)
145 Massoth v. Central Bus Co., 134 A. 236 (1926)
146 id.
147 Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1 (1922;
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same compensation was given to each of the directors
regardless of the amount of services he rendered, that many
of the extra services claimed to have been performed as a
justification for the remuneration were in fact within the
scope of the duties of the directors and should presumably
have been performed by them148 . In conclusion the court
stated that « Many of [the services] , if rendered, were, as
we have said, not in the organization of the company, some
were within the duties of directors, and none were such as
the company could reasonably be expected to pay for » 149 .
One could ask how what « the company could reasonably be
expected to pay for » is measured by the courts. In Saxe
v. Brady 150 , the Court of Chancery of Delaware faced that
same question and indeed noted that « A court is confronted
with inherent difficulties in determining whether payments
for services are ^reasonable' or ^excessive' . The value of
services is obviously a matter of judgment on the part of
the person who must pay for them » 151 (this principle has
been reaffirmed several years later in Kaufman v. Beal 152 ) .
The court then noted that one way of determining a
reasonable value is « to compare the results with amounts
paid to other persons performing the same kind of
148 Id. at 4
149 Id. at 4
150 184 A. 2d 602 (1962
151 Id. at 609
152 1983 WL 20295 (1983) (not reported in A. 2d)
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services » 153 (Citations omitted). Then, if « [flailing to
find any ^shocking disparity' between these two sums, even
though the amount paid to [a director or an officer]
exceeded the industry average, the court [should conclude]
that the amount paid were not ^legally excessive' » 154 .
Finally, the court held that when taking all the financial
data available, « [r]esolution of the question ultimately
depends on the weight to be attributed to each of the very
many economic factors argued to the court » 155 . The
comparison made by the court between the compensation
challenged and other compensation paid has sometimes been
limited by the courts to a comparison inside the same
corporation. Thus in Wilderman v. Wilderman 156 , the court
held that in determining the reasonableness of the
compensation courts should consider the amounts previously
received by the concerned director or officer, and the
amount of the challenged salary compared to other salaries
paid by the employer. On the contrary, in the recent years
executive compensation has been compared to, and even found
disproportionate to the salaries paid to the senior
executives of foreign corporations 157 . However, the
153 Lofland v. Cahall
,
118 A. 1 (1922) at 609
154 Id. at 610
155 Id. at 611
156 315 A. 2d 610 (1974), at 614
*->' See for example Shareholders Rights, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess. 49 (1991) : « It is undeniably true that
the cash compensation in salary and bonuses granted American CEOs
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contrasting argument is that foreign compensation cannot
and should not be directly compared to American
compensation because foreign compensation includes perks
which are difficult to value and are generally not granted
their American counterpart 158 . Therefore, it is to be
noted that the American Law Institute, in its analysis and
recommendations to corporations, still refers to the
standards of revision of the reasonableness of executive
compensation set several decades ago 159 .
The reasonableness of the compensation can also be
measured by comparing it to the financial condition of the
corporation. In Wilderman v. Wilderman 160 , the court held
that one of the factors judicially recognized to determine
whether the compensation of officers or directors is
reasonable is whether such compensation bears a reasonable
relation to the success of the corporation. Indeed,
« [cjorporate directors, in fixing their salaries as
officers must, of course, have regard for the
reasonableness of the salaries in light of the financial
condition of the corporation » 161 (citations omitted)
.
generally exceeds that given to similarly situated CEOs in foreign
countries. »
158 Andrew R. Bronstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay ?
The Press ? Congress ? Shareholders ?, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June
1992, at 32
159 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance : Analysis and
Recommendations, section 5.03, Compensation of Directors and Senior
Executives (1994)
160 315 A. 2d 610 (1974)
161 Moran v. Edson, 493 F.2d 400 (1973)
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Thus, courts are going to look at the way the business was
run under the officer's management, the size and the volume
of the business, to determine whether the challenged
compensation and/or bonuses are fair and reasonable.
Similarly, in Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp. 162 the
court compared the challenged salary of the officer to the
benefits conferred on the corporation by him in determining
the reasonableness of the compensation. But the court did
not establish any quantitative measure with which to
determine the propriety of executive compensation. Of
course, the percentage of the gains of the business granted
must not be unreasonable per se 163 . The situation has not
changed in the 1990s. One of the major argument forwarded
supporting the contention that something is still wrong
with executive compensation in America is that such
executive compensation is not related to corporate
performance 164 . When discussing this issue, the American
Law Institute again referred to Beard v. Elster 165 , which
was decided in 1960 and nevertheless still provides the
standard to be used by the courts or by the corporations
162 64 A. 2d. 581 (Del. 1948)
163 Rogers v. Hill
, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)
164 Shareholders Rights, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1
st Sess. 4 9 (1991) : « Some statistics indicate that the compensation
paid to several chief executive officers bore little, if any,
relationship to the success of the corporation. »
165 160 A. 2d 731 (1960)
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when fixing officers compensation 166 . The American Law
Institute therefore noted that it will be expected that
adequate procedures will be instituted to ensure that
compensation based on corporate profitability is accurately
calculated 167 .
Finally, for compensation to be upheld courts used to
require that consideration to the corporation exist, and
that such consideration effectively pass to the
corporation. The question of the accuracy of the
consideration standard is important because of its link
with the notion of waste.
C. CONSIDERATION AND THE WASTE STANDARD
The early Delaware cases established that even in the
presence of informed ratification, stock option grants had
to satisfied a two part test 168 . Indeed, it was necessary
that the court conclude that the grant contemplates that
the corporation will receive sufficient consideration 169 .
In Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc. 170 , the
Supreme Court stated that « Sufficient consideration to the
corporation may be, inter alia, the retention of the
166 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance : Analysis and




169 Id., citing Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc. , 90 A. 2d
652 (1952)
170 90 A. 2d 652 (1952)
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services of an employee, or the gaining of the services of
a new employee, provided there is a reasonable relationship
between the value of the services to be rendered by the
employee and the value of the options granted as an
inducement or compensation. » 171 . Consideration hence did
not look like a waste standard 172 . If the existence of
consideration was necessary for the compensation to be
valid, it was not enough. Indeed, it was held that in
addition, the plan or the circumstances of the grant had to
include « conditions or the existence of circumstances
which may be expected to insure that the contemplated
compensation will in fact pass to the corporation. » 173 .
The court later referred to « circumstances which may
reasonably be regarded as sufficient to insure that the
corporation will receive that which it desires... » 174 .
Such requirement that the corporation takes steps to ensure
the actual transfer of the consideration to it is still
accurate and is restated by the American Law Institute
which reminds that if section 5.03 vests wide discretion in
disinterested directors when adopting compensation
arrangement, they must nevertheless satisfy themselves
« that the corporation can reasonably be expected to
receive the benefits contemplated by a particular
171 Id. at 656
172 Lewis v. Voqelstein
, 699 A. 2d 327 (1997) at 336
173 Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 83 A. 2d 473 (1951)
174 Id. at 657
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arrangement » 175 . Nevertheless, the case of Lewis v.
Vogelstein 176 talk about the consideration standard in a
different context : Delaware law treating shareholder
ratification of corporate plans that authorize the granting
of stock options to corporate officers and directors.
According to this court, the standard of consideration was
at that time used in place of the actual standard of waste.
Furthermore, in this case 177 the court holds that the use
of those test was in practice very problematic. Indeed,
valuing an option grant was, and still is, quite
difficult 178 . The court adds that is even more difficult
to value the future benefit that the corporation hopes to
obtain from the option grant 179 . In Beard v. Elster 180 , the
court stated that the requirement that all stock option
plans contain conditions or that surrounding circumstances
are such that the corporation will receive the benefit
expected constituted the consideration implicit in every
stock option plan by itself. By doing so, the Delaware
Supreme Court slightly relaxed the general formulation of
Kerbs, and rejected its reading to the effect that the
175 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance : Analysis and
Recommendations, section 5.03, Compensation of Directors and Senior
Executives (1994)
176 699 A. 2d 327 (1997)
177 699 A. 2d 327 (1997), at 337
178 Id
179 Id.
180 160 A. 2d 731 (1959)
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corporation had to have or insure receipt of legally
cognizable consideration to make an option grant valid 181 .
Furthermore, the court in Beards 182 emphasized the effect
of an approval by an independent board or committee. It
indeed held that a good faith determination by a
disinterested board of directors or committee that the
corporation may reasonably expect to receive a
proportionate benefit from the grant of the option entitled
such a grant to business judgment protection, at least when
ratified by a disinterested shareholders vote. The court
in Lewis 183 pointed to the fact that judicial review has
focused more on the procedures used to authorize and ratify
grants, than on trying to assess whether the corporation in
fact would receive proportionate value 184 , suggesting that
the criteria of consideration had been abandoned by
Delaware courts, at least in such a situation.
The last question to be studied in the thesis is to
determine what will happen if no compensation has been
adopted, or if the decision fixing such compensation is
struck down by the courts. Does that mean that the officer
or director will have rendered the services for free ?
Such a statement would seem quite unfair. Consequently,
the courts have successively used the theories of the
181 Lewis v. Voqelstein , 699 A. 2d 327 (1997) at 337, 33i
182 160 A. 2d 731 (1959)
183 699 A>2 d 327 (1997)
184 Id. at 338
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implied contract and the theory of quantum meruit to allow
directors and officers to recover for the services
rendered.
CHAPTER III
IMPLIED CONTRACT AND QUANTUM MERUIT
The problem addressed here could be considered as one
of fairness or equity. Indeed, the question is : how to
compensate an officer or director for services rendered by
him to the corporation where no compensation has legally
been adopted by the board of directors ? This question is
addressed by the Court of Chancery of Delaware in
Technicorp International II, Inc. v. Johnston 185 . The
earlier rule of Delaware governing director's and officer's
compensation was fixed Cahall v. Lofland 186 which stated
that : - directors of a corporation were trustees for the
stockholders and were therefore submitted to the utmost
good faith and fair dealing, especially were their
individual interests were concerned ;
- they had no right to compensation for services
rendered within the scope of their duties as directors,
unless it was authorized by the charters, by-laws, or the
stockholders of the company ;
- they had no right to compensation for services
rendered outside their duties a directors unless there had
185 1997 WL 538671 (1997) (not reported in A. 2d)
186 114 A. 224 (1921;
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been an express contract to pay for such services, or
unless the services were clearly outside their duties as
directors and performed under circumstances sufficient to
show that it was understood by the proper officer, as well
as by the directors claiming the compensation, that the
services were to be paid for by the corporation ;
- a contract to pay compensation for such services
had been made with directors, or officers who had no
personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract,
and who were competent to represent the company in the
transaction 187 .
Under this view, to be able to recover for his
services, a director or officer had to prove that an
alleged implied agreement had been made with directors or
officers who were disinterested. In the contrary, no
compensation could be recovered. Nevertheless, the Lofland
v. Cahall rule no longer control 188 . Nevertheless, such an
affirmation does not mean that directors or officers cannot
recover for their services. Indeed, courts have recognized
a right to recover under the theory of quantum meruit 189 .
The Technicorp Court points to Hall v. John S. Isaacs and
Sons Farms 190 . In this case, the defendants had voted
187 Lofland v. Cahall , 118 A.l (1922)
188 Technicorp International II, Inc. , 1997 WL 538671 (1997) (not
reported in A. 2d)
189 Id. at 15
190 146 A. 2d 602 (1958)
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themselves salary increases ; the court acknowledged that
the salaries would be invalid under Lofland v. Cahall 191
,
but still said that « the salary recipients may yet
establish that such payments to them, although unauthorized
by a proper board and not validly ratified by independent
stockholders are recoverable upon a theory of quantum
meruit » 192 . The reason why the court allowed recovery on
that basis was that there was no evidence that the
executives had purposefully granted themselves excessive
salaries to deprive the minority stockholders of dividends
or to dissipate corporate assets 193 . The court reached a
similar conclusion in Wilderman v. Wilderman 194 .
Therefore, under Hall v. Isaacs and Wilderman , interested
executives may be entitled to recover the reasonable value
of their services on the basis of quantum meruit if they
can demonstrate that : they provided services as officers
with the understanding that they would be compensated, they
did not grant themselves excessive compensation to unjustly
enrich themselves, and the corporation which received the
services benefited from them and would be unjustly enriched
if the executives were not compensated 195 . In fine, the
court noted that such an approach is consistent with 8 Del.
191 Id at 610, 611
192 Id. at 612
193 id.
194 315 A. 2d 610 (1974)
195 Technicorp International II, Inc. , 1997 WL 538671 (1997) (not
reported in A. 2d)
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C. § 144, which provides that in specified circumstances a
self dealing transaction with directors will not be held
invalid solely for that reason 19 ^.
196 Id. at 16
CONCLUSION
The question of officers and directors compensation is
a very important one. Not only does it govern what
officers and director will be able to receive in exchange
for the services performed, but it also is part of officers
and directors liability. Such importance of the topic is
even increased by the public scrutiny witnessed in the
1990s, as was said in the introduction of this thesis.
Therefore, it is useful for the corporation and its
officers and directors to have a road map of what is
allowed, and what is not.
The first point is the one of the fixation of the
compensation ; who has the power to fix it, and what are
the rules to follow when doing so ? It is a well settled
rule that the management of a corporation belongs to its
board of directors. Therefore, such board of directors
should have the power to fix officers' and directors'
compensation. When the board of directors fixes officers'
and directors' salary, its decision is protected by the
business judgment rule. In practice, however, two
doctrines operate to preclude judicial deference to the
business judgment rule. First, the decision may include
self-dealing. Self-dealing being typically considered to
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be a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the
business judgment rule does not apply. In such a case, the
Common Law Rule was that a self-dealing transaction was
automatically voidable. Nevertheless, court have stated
that corporate directors may be given the power to fix
their own salary by statute, charter, bylaws or the
stockholders. Thus, courts, as well as most of states
statutes, permit self-dealing transactions if there has
been proper ratification by disinterested directors or
shareholders. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that if at the time a director voted in favor of a
resolution fixing salaries or fees, he was disinterested,
the fact that he later became eligible for the benefits
therefrom does not invalidate the resolution. Therefore,
the first thing a corporation should be able to do with
regard to compensation is to prove that it has been
approved by a disinterested board or committee of the
board. However, if the board has failed to take this
precaution, or if all of the directors are interested as
well (as in the case of most closely held corporations),
approval by disinterested shareholders can be used to save
the compensation decision from automatic voidability.
Hence, when the compensation of officers or directors has
not been approved by a disinterested board of directors, it
is highly recommended that the corporation seeks approval
by the shareholders. Indeed, courts will give a lot of
weight to the action of the stockholders. Therefore, if
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stockholders subsequently ratify a decision fixing officers
or directors compensation, courts won't review it. The
executive compensation decision can also be saved from
automatic voidability as self-dealing if it is proved to be
fair to the corporation. Such may be the only practical
alternative in closely held corporations. In Delaware,
while a transaction can be saved from automatic voidability
if proved to be fair, it will nonetheless be invalidated if
it's unfair, therefore creating a dual requirement of
fairness. Consequently, a decision may be held invalid by
a Delaware court, although it was valid when originally
adopted, if it appears to be unfair to the corporation.
But such an intervention of the courts will occur only when
really required, only in extreme cases.
The second doctrine operating to preclude judicial
deference to decisions of the board of directors is the
doctrine of waste of corporate assets. No corporation is
generally permitted to give away or « waste » its assets.
Most courts evaluating compensation considered to be a
waste of corporate assets impose two main requirements for
the compensation to be upheld : there must be consideration
passing to the corporation in exchange for the
compensation, and it must bear a reasonable relationship to
the benefits received by the corporation. Concerning the
existence of some consideration passing to the corporation,
courts generally invalidate only compensation that is
clearly in consideration for past services or that require
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no future service by the beneficiary. Hence, the board of
directors should make sure that the decision granting
compensation to an officer or director will secure the
effective transfer of consideration to the corporation, for
example by binding the beneficiary of the payments by an
employment contract. But the most important issue is the
one of reasonableness, i.e. the existence of a reasonable
relationship between the compensation and the benefit of
the corporation. Payments are evaluated against a certain
number of different factors, the most frequently mentioned
being compensation of similar executives in other companies
in the same industry, the success of the corporation, the
ability and performance of the executive, and the absolute
size of the payment. Therefore, the board of directors
should bear all these factors in mind when granting
compensation. It is important to note here that some of
those factors cannot, and will not be applied by courts
when the compensation consists in the grant of stock
options, restricted stocks or similar incentive plans. For
example, when considering the adequacy of the compensation,
one can argue that the link between the executive's
performance and an increase in stock price is doubtful.
Indeed, it is extremely difficult to determine whether an
increase in stock price is the result of the action of a
specific executive, or if its due to general good economic
conditions or even the action of a former executive.
However, such form of remuneration must still bear a
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reasonable relationship with the profit of the corporation,
and the fact that directors are given more discretion does
not mean that there will be no control by the courts.
Hence, corporations should institute adequate procedures to
ensure that incentive compensation based on corporate
profitability is accurately calculated. Nevertheless, it
could be interesting for a corporation to favor those kind
of remuneration over cash compensation.
The last thing to consider as far as officers' or
directors' compensation is concerned is whether such
officers or directors will be able to be compensated in
case of invalidation of the resolution fixing their
compensation, and if yes, how. Indeed, even if the
resolution adopting the compensation of officers or
directors is held invalid, in most of the case the
corporation still got some benefit from the services
rendered. Therefore, the courts will use either the
implied contract or the theory of quantum meruit to allow
the directors and officers to recover for their services.
An implied contract will be inferred from the conduct of
the parties : when it appears that the officers or
directors performed some services expecting to be
compensated for them, and the corporation was aware of the
situation, the courts will hold that an implied contract
was created between said officers or directors and the
corporation, and will allow the former to recover the fair
value of the services rendered. The same result will be
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obtained by application of the theory of quantum meruit,
which can be qualified as an equitable doctrine based on
the principle that one who benefits by the labor of another
should not be unjustly enriched thereby.
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